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CASE NOTES
Inevitably, the court's opinion will be sounded in search of admissible
phrasing of a money-oriented argument. The opinion does not seem to
preclude a breakdown of the alleged duration of past and future suffering
into small time units and, where the evidence warrants, the introduction
of life and expectancy tables.2 0 A decision of this nature will generate re-
search and an invigorating resourcefulness by those disgruntled attorneys
whose interests are, for the moment, somewhat displaced. Novel and
theatrical uses of demonstrative evidence will possibly ensue, fostering
the "hollywood" trial which courts uniformly eschew. It would seem,
however, that in the balance may be the ultimate integrity of judicial
control of judicial affairs.
26 Presumably counsel is free to use a per diem basis to calculate loss of future earn-
ings in his final argument, provided there has been testimony as to plaintiff's past
earnings and his diminished earning capacity. The prohibition in Caley appears to be
limited to the amount demanded for pain and suffering.
EVIDENCE-DECLARATION AGAINST PENAL INTEREST
EXCEPTION TO HEARSAY RULE
McGraw brought a negligence action against one Horn to recover
damages for injuries that were sustained in an automobile accident. Mc-
Graw alleged she was a passenger in an automobile driven by one Smith,
and that she was injured as a result of Horn's negligent operation of his
automobile. At the trial a police officer was permitted to testify as to a
conversation with Smith which took place in a hospital one-half hour
after the accident. The officer testified that Smith told him he did not see
Horn's car nor the Yield Right of Way sign. The jury returned a ver-
dict for the defendant and the plaintiff appealed. On appeal it was urged
by the plaintiff that the testimony of the officer was pure hearsay and
came within no exception to the hearsay rule; that the officer's testimony
did not fall within the declaration against interest exception because the
statement by Smith could only have subjected Smith to penal or civil
liability. The Indiana Appellate Court agreed with the contentions of the
plaintiff and reversed the decision of the trial court. The Court held that
to render such extrajudicial statements admissible, they must be against
the pecuniary or proprietary interest of the declarant and not merely
such as would subject him to criminal action or civil suit. McGraw v.
Horn, 183 N.E. 2d 206 (Ind. 1962).
The decision of the Court recognized the well-established rule that any
statement that is a narration of a past event by a person who is not a wit-
ness in the case constitutes hearsay.' Although the hearsay rule is deeply
1 State v. Labbee, 134 Wash. 55, 234 Pac. 1049 (1925).
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rooted in our legal system, the courts have made a number of exceptions
to the rule. The McGraw case was concerned with only one of these ex-
ceptions, namely, a declaration by one not a party to the proceeding (a
third party) that was against his interest. In formulating this exception,
the courts reasoned that people do not ordinarily make false statements
against their own interests. Therefore, statements made against interest
must be true.2
An illustration of the declaration against interest exception will facili-
tate an understanding of the rules enunciated by the courts. A states to W
that he owes his wife $5000. Sixty days thereafter, A transfers Blackacre
to his wife and then dies. The creditors of A bring suit to have the con-
veyance of Blackacre set aside as fraudulent. W then offers to testify re-
garding A's statement to him that he owed his wife $5000. Since the
statement of A, as to his indebtedness, could have subjected him to pecu-
niary liability to his wife, we shall see that it comes within the "against
interest" exception and is admissible.
The early English cases 3 that gave birth to the exception formulated a
much more liberal rule than the one which was later developed. In fact,
one case indicated that any statement by a person having no interest to
deceive would be admissible. 4 Under such a rule, the mere fact that the
declarant had no reason to lie would render the statement admissible. In
the 1829 case of Middleton v. Melton,5 the Court held it was no longer
sufficient to merely have no reason to lie. The statement must be "against
interest." Obviously, this was a more conservative position than that taken
earlier, but it was merely a "sneak preview" of what was to come.
In the Sussex Peerage Case,6 decided in England in 1844, the Court de-
parted from the liberal construction of the exception formulated by the
early English cases. The plaintiff contended he was a decedent of George
I and asserted the validity of a marriage performed in Rome. At the trial
a clergyman's son offered to testify that his father, since deceased, told
him of performing the marriage. The plaintiff urged that this testimony,
though hearsay, should be received under the declaration against interest
exception, since the clergyman realized he was committing a crime by
- CLEARY, HANDBOOK OF ILLINOIS EVIDENCE S 1319 (1956).
3Hulet's Trial, 5 How. St. 1192 (1660); Standen v. Standen, Peake 45, 170 Eng. Rep.
73 (1791). Also see, Powell v. Harper, 5 Car. & P. 590, 172 Eng. Rep. 1112 (1833) where
a confession of a third party to the effect that he had committed larceny was held
admissible.
4 In Doe v. Robson, 15 East 32, 34, 104 Eng. Rep. 756, 757 (1812), Lord Ellenborough
stated: "The ground upon which this evidence has been received is, that there is a
total absence of interest .. . to pervert the fact ......
G10 B. & C. 317, 109 Eng. Rep. 467 (1829).
6 11 CI. & Fin. 85, 8 Eng. Rep. 1034 (H.L. 1844).
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performing the marriage. The Court rejected the plaintiff's contention
and held the testimony inadmissible. To qualify for the declaration against
interest exception, the Court said, the statement offered must have been
against the pecuniary or proprietary interest of the declarant, and not
merely against a penal interest. The Court thereby constructed a wall
around the exception that still stands and cast penal declarations in the
scrap-heap outside of the wall.7
A majority of the courts, which have considered the question in the
United States, have elected to follow the English rule as stated by the
Sussex Peerage Case. In holding declarations against penal interest to be
outside the scope of the declaration against interest exception, however,
the American courts have stated three different rules. Some courts con-
sider the exception and indicate in unmistakable language that the declara-
tion must be against the pecuniary or proprietary interest of the declarant.8
Therefore, statements that may subject the declarant to a criminal prose-
cution are held inadmissible. A few other courts exclude penal declara-
tions, per se, and do not mention either the hearsay rule or the fact that
an exception exists for declarations against interest.0 A third rule is
enunciated by a far greater number of courts than the first two. These
courts find the disposition of penal statements an easy task by merely
rejecting them as hearsay.10 When courts merely dismiss the offer of evi-
dence as hearsay, especially without even discussing the exception, it
displays a lack of analysis and reasoning that has caused at least one corn-
mentator to be extremely critical."
It is amusing to note the lengths to which the pecuniary or proprietary
rule can be stretched by a willing court. In the case of Weber v. Chicago,
R.I. & P. Ry. Co.,12 the court admitted a declaration of a criminal act on
the theory that the same act might also subject the declarant to a tort
7 Id. at 113-14, 8 Eng. Rep. at 1045, where Lord Campbell states: "I think it would
lead to most inconvenient consequences, both to individuals and to the public, if we
were to say that the apprehension of a criminal prosecution was an interest which
ought to let in such declarations in evidence."
8 Weber v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 175 Iowa 358, 151 N.W, 852 (1915); County
of Mahaska v. Ingalls, 16 Iowa 81 (1864).
9 State v. Bailey, 74 Kan. 873, 87 Pac. 189 (1906); Robinson v. State, 114 Ga. 445, 40
S.E. 253 (1901).
10 Commonwealth v. Chin Kee, 283 Mass. 248, 186 N.E. 253 (1933); Flemming v.
State, 95 Vt. 154, 113 At. 783 (1921); State v. Gonzales, 19 N.M. 467, 144 Pac. 1144
(1914); Mays v. State, 72 Neb. 723, 101 N.W. 979 (1904).
11 In a note in 37 L.R.A. (n.s.) 345, 350 it is said: "Most of the decisions, however,
dispose of the question with little more than a shake of the head; and if, therefore, the
rule is founded in reason, we must look elsewhere than to judicial opinion in order to
find the reason."
1L 175 Iowa 358, 151 N.V. 852 (1915).
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action and consequent pecuniary liability. If this theory were applied to
all statements against penal interest, the majority rule could do little
harm, since nearly every crime against the person or property of another
creates tort liability.
One rationale which is given for refusing to admit a declaration against
penal interest is that to admit the declaration would create a danger of
perjured testimony. '8 The cry of perjury, however, is the ancient rusty
weapon often advanced to oppose a reform in the rules of evidence. In
fact, this would be a good argument against admitting any witnesses at
all, for it is notorious that some witnesses will lie on the stand, and it is
difficult to avoid being deceived by them.14
A minority of courts in the United States, considering the question,
hold that the declaration against interest exception to the hearsay rule in-
cludes declarations against penal interest. The most frequent illustration
occurs where A is being tried for murder, B confesses the same murder
to W and later B dies. A offers W to testify as to the confession on the
ground that the confession was a declaration against B's interest when
made, since it could have subjected B to prosecution for the crime. The
minority courts would hold such a statement admissible, although the
specific requirements for admissibility vary between jurisdictions.
The Texas courts are in the minority, but have been reluctant to give
vent to a full exception for penal declarations. They hold that if the evi-
dence against the defendant is entirely circumstantial, and if there is also
evidence pointing to the guilt of the third party declarant, then the
latter's extrajudicial confession will be received, but not otherwise.'8
The courts of Maryland have gone through three stages, finally arriv-
ing at a full exception. In 1920, Maryland was considered to be a staunch
supporter of the majority position.'6 A later case qualified the rule by
admitting the confession of a third party, but limiting the holding as
precedent to its particular facts."7 In a 1961 Maryland murder case, Brady
v. State,'s the prosecution contended on appeal that an unsigned confes-
sion by a third party, withheld from the defense, was not admissible in
any event. The Court held the state was in error, and that a confession
of a third party is admissible.
In the case of Hines v. Commonwealth, 19 Virginia adopted the view of
13 Brown v. State, 99 Miss. 719, 55 So. 961 (1911).
14 S WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1477 (3d ed. 1940).
15 Stinson v. State, 124 Tex. Crim. 52, 60 S.W. 2d 773 (1933); Blocker v. State, 55 Tex
Crim. 30, 114 S.W. 814 (1908).
16 Baehr v. State, 136 Md. 128, 110 Atl. 103 (1920).
17 Brennan v. State, 151 Md. 265, 134 AtI. 148 (1926).
Is 226 Md. 422, 174 A. 2d 167 (1961). 19 136 Va. 728, 117 S.E. 843 (1923).
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Mr. Justice Holmes20 that declarations against penal interest should be
admissible. Like Maryland though,2' the Court restricted the operation of
the rule to the facts of that case. In the recent case of Newberry v. Com-
monwealth2 2 Virginia removed the restriction. Both Maryland and Vir-
ginia, therefore, recognize a full exception for declarations against penal
interest as a result of cases decided in 1961 and 1950, respectively.
The other states which support the minority position are Idaho, 23 and
recently, Missouri2 4 and Illinois. 25
It is evident from the foregoing that the modern tendency is to admit
declarations against penal interest, 20 and that courts which were cautious
with the admission of these declarations at first 27 are now dropping their
reservations.281 Notwithstanding this, however, South Carolina is retreat-
ing from its original minority stand. The case of Coleman v. Frazier, 20
decided in 1850, held penal declarations admissible. But a 1958 case,
McClain v. Anderson Free Press,30 has limited the effect of that decision.
Although the Court in the McClain case indicated the 1850 decision was
still the law, practically speaking this is questionable, since the case in-
20 In Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 277 (1913), Mr. Justice Holmes said in
dissenting: "The confession of Joe Dick, since deceased, that he committed the murder
for which the plaintiff in error was tried, coupled with circumstances pointing to its
truth, would have a very strong tendency to make any one outside of a court of justice
believe that Donnelly did not commit the crime. I say this, of course, on the supposi-
tion that it should be proved that the confession really was made, and that there was
no ground for connecting Donnelly with Dick. The rules of evidence in the main are
based on experience, logic and common sense, less hampered by history than some
parts of the substantive law. There is no decision by this court against the admissibility
of such a confession; the English cases since the separation of the two countries do not
bind us; the exception to the hearsay rule in the case of declarations against interest is
well known; no other statement is so much against interest as a confession of murder,
it is far more calculated to convince than dying declarations which would be let in to
hang a man ... and when we surround the accused with so many safeguards, some of
which seem to me excessive, I think we ought to give him the benefit of a fact that,
if proved, commonly would have such weight. The history of the law and the argu-
ments against the English doctrine are so well and fully stated by Mr. Wigmore that
there is no need to set them forth at greater length."
21 Brennan v. State, 151 Md. 265, 134 Ati. 148 (1926).
22191 Va. 445, 61 S.E. 2d 318 (1950).
23 State v. Alcorn, 7 Idaho 599, 64 Pac. 1014 (1901).
4 Sutter v. Easterly, 354 Mo. 282, 189 S.W. 2d 284 (1945).
- People v. Lettrich, 413 Ill. 172, 108 N.E. 2d 488 (1952).
26 Ibid. Sutter v. Easterly, 354 Mo. 282, 189 S.W. 2d 284 (1945).
27 Brennan v. State, 151 Md. 265, 134 Atl. 148 (1926); Hines v. Commonwealth, 136
Va. 728, 117 S.E. 843 (1923).
28 Newberry v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 445, 61 S.E. 2d 318 (1950); Brady v. State,
226 Md. 422, 174 A. 2d 167 (1961).
"J 16 S.C. 59 (1850). :0 232 S.C. 448, 102 S.E. 2d 750 (1958).
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volved what was clearly a declaration against penal interest and it was held
inadmissible.
A historical review of the Illinois cases, which have considered the ex-
ception, mirrors the position of nearly every jurisdiction. In the case of
Crain v. Wrigbt,31 decided in 1867, the Court held what was a declaration
against the pecuniary interest of a third party to be admissible. The deci-
sion, however, made no reference to the hearsay rule or the declaration
against interest exception. A later case, Drabek v. Grand Lodge,3 2 char-
acterized what was in fact a declaration against interest, which would
have subjected the declarant to both pecuniary and penal liability, as an
admission against interest and admitted the declaration. 33
In German Insurance Co. v. Bartlett,3 4 a 1900 case, the Supreme Court
of Illinois was concerned with a suit brought by creditors to set aside an
allegedly fraudulent conveyance by a husband to his wife. The Court
held that a declaration by the husband, admitting he was indebted to his
wife, was admissible. The Court stated the requirements of the declara-
tion against interest exception to be that: (1) the declarant is dead; (2)
the declaration was against the pecuniary interest of the declarant when
made; (3) the declarant had competent knowledge of the fact declared;
(4) the declarant had no probable motive to falsify. The language used
by the Court in the Bartlett case would seem to preclude the admission of
a declaration against penal interest in 1900.
More than 50 years after the Bartlett decision, the question of whether
penal declarations, standing alone, were admissible in Illinois was presented
on an appellate level for the first time. In the case of People v. Lettrich,3 5
the Supreme Court added Illinois to the growing number of minority
jurisdictions that admit declarations against penal interest as an exception
to the hearsay rule. The Court held that the testimony of a director of a
behavior clinic, to the effect that someone other than the defendent had
confessed the same murder to him, was admissible and reversed the hold-
ing of the lower court. In a well-reasoned opinion the Court stated:
The general rule, supported by the great weight of authority, is that extra-judicial declarations of a third party, not made under oath, that he committed
the crime; are purely hearsay, and even though they are declarations against
interest, are inadmissible .... The rule is sound and should not be departed
from except in cases where it is obvious that justice demands a departure.36
3146 111 107 (1867). 3 2 24 I11. App. 82 (1887).
33 Apparently, the court confused the admissions exception, which is always made by
a party to the proceeding or one in privity, with the declaration against interest
exception.
-34 188 111.165, 58 N.E. 1075 (1900).
35 413 Ill. 172,108 N.E. 2d 488 (1952). 36 Id. at 178, 108 N.E. 2d 491-92.
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The Court went on to say, that since the state was relying solely on the
repudiated confession of the defendant, justice demanded that the third
party's confession be received. It is also interesting to note that the
declarant was not shown to be dead, as required by the Bartlett case. Since
the only subsequent case that considered the exception in Illinois37 was
concerned solely with a declaration against a pecuniary interest, it is still
a moot question whether the Lettrich case will be confined to its par-
ticular facts.
In conclusion, it is submitted that a declaration against penal interest
cannot be treated in the same manner as a declaration against pecuniary
interest. If the confession of every crackpot (and such are not uncommon
in cases of wide notoriety) were held to be admissible, the issues before
the jury would become a hopeless morass. However, the refusal of the
majority jurisdictions to admit penal declarations, even where it would
seem that justice demands a departure from the orthodox rule, is untena-
ble. The rational rule, it would seem, is the minority rule.
37 Haskell v. Siegmund, 28 111. App. 2d 1, 170 N.E. 2d 393 (1960).
INSURANCE-CHANGE OF BENEFICIARY BY WILL
Plaintiff's son brought an action against his mother claiming the right to
the proceeds of two group life insurance policies. The policies, taken out
by John Suga, father of the plaintiff and husband of the defendant, named
the defendant as beneficiary. John Suga died testate, however, and his will
bequeathed the proceeds of the life insurance to the plaintiff. The policies
provided for a change of beneficiary by any written request filed at the
headquarters of the employer or home office of the company; such change
was to be effective as of the date of execution of the request, whether the
insured be living or not at the time of the filing, but without prejudice to
the insurer. The insurer, previously joined, was dismissed upon payment
of the proceeds to the clerk for deposit. Plaintiff argued that the unique
wording of the policy permitted change of beneficiary by will, and that
the court effectuate his father's intent. The decision in the lower court for
the defendant was affirmed by the Illinois Appellate Court. The basis of
the decision was that where the policy regulates the method of change, such
method is generally exclusive to that extent. Furthermore, it was held
that the widow's rights vested upon the death of the insured; the request
for change must be made during the lifetime of the insured, and the will
was ineffective until after death. Suga v. Suga, 35 111. App. 355, 182 N.E.
2d 922 (1962).
Generally, if there is no restriction or exclusive method for changing
